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A decision-analysis-based framework for analyzing stakeholder behaviour in scenario 
planning 
 
Abstract 
Scenario planning is a method widely used by strategic planners to address uncertainty about the 
future. However, current methods either fail to address the future behaviour and impact of 
stakeholders or they treat the role of stakeholders informally.  We present a practical decision-
analysis-based methodology for analysing stakeholder objectives and likely behaviour within 
contested unfolding futures. We address issues of power, interest, and commitment to achieve 
desired outcomes across a broad stakeholder constituency. Drawing on frameworks for corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), we provide an illustrative example of our approach to analyse a 
complex contested issue that crosses geographic, organizational and cultural boundaries. Whilst 
strategies can be developed by individual organizations that consider the interests of others – for 
example in consideration of an organization’s CSR agenda – we show that our augmentation of 
scenario method provides a further, nuanced, analysis of the power and objectives of all 
concerned stakeholders across a variety of unfolding futures. The resulting modelling framework 
is intended to yield insights and hence more informed decision  making by individual 
stakeholders or regulators. 
  
KEY WORDS: Strategic planning; ethics in OR; decision processes; scenario method; 
education. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Scenario analysis has long been recognized as a tool for strategic analysis by 
organizations (cf. Schoemaker, 1991).  In an uncertain and volatile world it avoids the dangers 
inherent in statistical extrapolations of current trends, or the biases that are often associated with 
experts’ estimates of future event probabilities. It provides a structured approach to enable the 
development of multiple narrative-based characterizations of how possible futures might unfold 
and allows alternative strategies to be tested so that their effectiveness and robustness can be 
assessed across these different futures. Recently, the combination of scenario method and multi-
attribute decision analysis has been developed to allow the effectiveness of strategies to be 
modelled when an organization has multiple objectives. The approach reflects the need to 
overcome the cognitive biases that have been identified in behavioral decision research. Because 
the human mind has limited information processing capacity these are likely to be particularly 
prominent when complex multifaceted problems are faced (e.g. Hogarth, 1987). The method 
addresses this by combining the benefits of using a structured ‘divide and conquer’ approach to 
decision making with those of scenario planning, such as its ability to challenge prevailing 
mental models and strategic inertia. As such, it offers a number of advantages to alternatives, 
such as the use of decision tree analysis for aiding decision making in the face of uncertainty (cf. 
Goodwin and Wright, 2001; Montibeller et al, 2006). However, one aspect of scenario planning 
that has received little attention is the development of structured approaches for anticipating the 
behaviour of stakeholders within particular scenarios (cf. Wright and Cairns, 2011). This aspect 
can be important because powerful stakeholders, whose interests are threatened by changes in 
their environment, are unlikely to remain inactive and their behaviour is likely to have a direct 
effect on the alternative futures that may prevail.  
In this paper, we extend scenario methodology by developing a practical and transparent 
modelling framework that allows the behaviour of stakeholders to be analysed within unfolding 
scenario storylines. The analysis is based on assessments of stakeholder objectives and power 
and their possible actions and reactions within alternative futures. The extended analysis 
therefore has the potential to help strategic planners to make more informed choices. For 
regulators, such as governments or international agencies, it can allow ethical aspects of 
decision-making to be addressed and can enable them to create pre-emptive legal and other 
frameworks that protect less powerful stakeholders from the actions of those who wield more 
power. Through an illustrative example, we show how the decomposition structure that is 
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inherent in our stakeholder analysis provides insights for understanding the complex interplay of 
individual stakeholder actions. 
  
The paper is structured as follows. First, we outline the intuitive logics scenario method 
as a tool for envisaging possible alternative futures that are regarded as being critical in terms of 
the uncertainty associated with them and/or their potential impact on an organization. We 
discuss how this basic method has been developed to involve consideration of the different 
perspectives of stakeholders (this enhancement is referred to as “critical scenario method” 
(CSM)), but argue that this approach should be extended further so that the behaviour of 
different stakeholders in different futures can be anticipated.  Then, we outline our augmentation 
of current scenario methods through embedding the stakeholder analysis framework. Thereafter, 
we present our illustrative example of application to the international business of ship disposal. 
Finally, we discuss the implications and limitations of our approach.  
 
2. Intuitive logics and the critical scenario method  
 
 In the basic intuitive logics approach to scenario development (Cairns et al, 2010, Wright 
and Cairns, 2011, Chapter 2), a focal issue is first analysed by exploring the “driving forces” – 
political, economic, social, technological, ecological and legal (PESTEL) factors – that will 
shape the emergent future. These driving forces are then clustered through causal/chronological 
analysis to determine a smaller number of “higher level factors”, impactful to the focal issue. 
These factors are subjected to comparative impact/uncertainty analysis, using a matrix where 
each is first ranked along the length the horizontal axis for perceived impact on the issue relative 
to all others. Then, without disturbing this horizontal ordering, they are ranked for relative 
uncertainty on the vertical axis – where uncertainty is related to what the outcomes of events that 
the factor encapsulates might be.  
The two factors that combine the greatest perceived impact with the greatest perceived 
uncertainty as to what that impact will be are labelled Factor A and Factor B. Four scenarios are 
constructed around the combination of “extreme outcomes” of Factors A and B (A1/B1; A1/B2; 
A2/B1; A2/B2). These outcomes need not be set on some “best/worst” continuum but, rather, 
might be defined in very different terms (e.g. financial vs. environmental) or in differential terms 
of either good (fine vs. excellent) or bad (poor vs. diabolical).  
 A key aspect of scenario development is that a wide range of perspectives and viewpoints 
should be brought to the process. One way to foster this is to ask participants to   consider the 
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interests of stakeholders and how they might behave to protect or further these interests (Wright 
and Cairns, 2011). However, in the basic scenario method consideration of stakeholders is an 
option to be used only when scenario builders consider their actions to be relevant. Cairns et al 
(2010) suggested that this is a limitation and proposed what they have referred to  as “critical 
scenario method” (CSM) which prompts interrogation of each of the scenarios from the 
perspective of the full range of stakeholders using Flyvbjerg’s (2001, 2003) value-rational 
question framework for phronetic social inquiry, namely: 
 
 “Where are we going? 
 Is this development desirable? 
 What, if anything, should we do about it? 
 Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power?” (Flyvbjerg, 2003: p. 
364) 
 
 In the extant CSM literature, the answer to the first question (Where are we going?) is 
assumed to be answered by the title and brief outline of each of the four scenarios – presenting 
four different possibilities that are applicable to all stakeholders. The answers to the second and 
third questions are set out in a basic tabular format that summarises each in a few words for each 
stakeholder group for each scenario in terms of a projected impact (Is this desirable?) and 
response (What should we do?). Here, the “we” is defined as the particular stakeholder group for 
whom the question is being considered. The final question is answered in summary form that 
considers all stakeholders and assesses which groups are major winners, which lose out and who 
holds key power, with the results presented in a tabular summary of basic “win/lose” options 
(Cairns et al., 2010, p. 977).  
CSM can inform organizational strategic planning; either for the self-interest of the 
stakeholder or to prompt advocacy and action by concerned stakeholders in support of others 
who may be largely powerless and excluded. However, it does so in a fairly basic way that lacks 
consideration of strategic options available to businesses, the nature of organization/stakeholder 
interplay and the values that might underpin managerial decision-making in response to different 
scenarios and in accordance with different corporate social responsibility (CSR) agendas. While 
the approach requires explicit consideration of mechanisms of power as currently conducted, it 
sets the various outcomes within a basic winner/loser choice and, as a result, it is not sensitive to 
different degrees of winning or losing for individual stakeholders across scenarios, or to the 
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relative power of multiple stakeholders within each scenario. In addition, it does not consider 
how a single organization may vary or put aside its corporate social responsibility agenda (cf. 
Garriga and Melé, 2004) under volatile market conditions. Tapinos (2012) distinguishes between 
scenario development – the construction of scenario stories of possible and plausible futures – 
and scenario planning as a process that is directed towards decision-making and action through 
combining scenario development with strategy development. It can be seen that CSM, as it is 
currently presented, engages with scenario development and the role of stakeholders but, through 
its basic binary classifications, it lacks sophistication to effectively inform strategy development 
and hence action. 
 
3. Background to the augmented CSM method 
 
3.1 The role of decision analysis 
 
Given the relative informality with which CSM incorporates the assessment of 
stakeholder values and actions, our enhancement of CSM involves the use of decision analysis 
modeling methods to apply a structure to the process. Decision analysis can yield a number of 
potential benefits in this context (cf. Goodwin and Wright, 2001, 2014, Ram and Montibeller, 
2013, Stewart et al. 2013). The need to consider a broad range of issues across a range of futures, 
including the organisation’s objectives and trade-offs between them, the performance of 
alternative strategies and the possible behaviour of significant actors within different scenarios 
can mean that scenario planning will be complex. In the face of this complexity behavioral 
decision research suggests that decision makers will address a restricted set of issues so that the 
planning problem, as they frame it, is a distorted and deficient representation of the real problem. 
The decomposition structure inherent in decision analysis is designed to allow decision makers 
to address all the key issues involved in a decision and determine whether the existing set of 
options and objectives can be enhanced (Ram and Montibeller, 2013).. Ram and Montibeller 
(2013) combined  multi-attribute decision analysis with scenario planning in three case problems 
in Trinidad and Tobago and found that it encouraged participants to gather more information 
about options reflect on whether the existing set of options could be improved upon.  
Decision analysis can also provide a number of tools to support the specific requirements 
of an augmented CSM. First, it can assist in the identification and structuring of the objectives of 
stakeholders (Montibeller and Franco, 2011). This can be done within the context of a value-
focussed framework (Keeney, 1992) which seeks to help decision makers to surface their 
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fundamental objectives –objectives that are both essential and controllable, in that the decision 
alternatives can influence the extent to which the objective is achieved.  This framework is 
intended to make explicit ‘the values that one cares about in [a given] context’ and hence 
produce statements of what the stakeholder wants to achieve in that context. The value-focussed 
framework distinguishes between means and ends objectives. An ends objective is an essential 
reason for a stakeholder’s interest in a situation. For example, it may be the minimization of the 
health impacts of an industrial activity on local population. Means objectives are those that are 
important because they have implications of other objectives.  For example, the minimization of 
sulphur dioxide emissions may be a means objective because it is important in order to minimize 
heath impacts.  
Tools such as means-ends objective networks and cognitive mapping can be used to 
sharpen an analyst’s understanding of the different stakeholders’ objectives and to distinguish 
between the different types. Gregory and Keeney (1994) report on an application of this 
approach in the elicitation of stakeholders’ objectives in relation to a proposal to construct a 
coalmine in Malaysia. The objectives here were elicited directly from representatives of the 
stakeholders and the intention here was to bring stakeholders together in the hope that they could 
find a solution that resolved their different interests. However, a key outcome was the generation 
of new policy alternatives that were acceptable to all parties. Such creative insights could also be 
helpful to an analyst attempting to anticipate alternative actions that might be pursued by actors 
who, while they are not formally engaged in negotiations or direct communications with other 
stakeholders, may through self-interest be considering mutually beneficial courses of action.  
Keller et al (2009) give detailed examples of other applications intended to: “identify mutually 
agreeable alternative actions, design new and better alternatives, and foresee opposition to 
decisions.” Again, these involved direct elicitation of objectives from stakeholders.   
However successful applications of decision analysis to negotiation problems described 
in Raiffa (1982), Ulvila and Snider (1980) and Goodwin and Wright (2014) found that the use of 
multiattribute value analysis helped analysts to anticipate the objectives and actions of actors 
without the opportunity of direct elicitation and even where attempts may have been made to 
conceal these factors to secure an advantage in negotiations 
Means-ends networks and similar tools can be linked to other decision analytic tools such 
as value trees (or objectives hierarchies) (Goodwin and Wright, 2014) to facilitate the formal 
evaluation of options against objectives.  Such an evaluation will require the objectives to be 
represented as attributes  (e.g. tonnes of SO2 emitted) which need to be carefully selected to 
allow measurement of the extent to which objectives  are achieved if different options are 
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pursued (Keeney and Gregory, 2005). These allow attribute values to be assigned numeric 
preference scores with the intention of making an unambiguous assessment of an option’s 
performance on an objective. Unambiguity is achieved when it is clear how to score a 
consequence on an attribute or how to interpret a score as a given consequence (Keeney and 
Gregory, 2005).  
When addressing uncertainty, decision analysis methods have typically employed 
assessments of probabilities, with utilities being used to represent decision makers’ risk 
preferences. However, when decision makers have multiple objectives such analyses can be 
extremely complex. Durbach and Stewart (2012) provide a critical review of alternative methods 
and conclude that “[the combination of multicriteria decision analysis and scenario planning] 
exemplify reasonable compromise positions on the spectrum between methods that are 
theoretically rich but heavily parameterized and practically complex, and those that are 
transparent and easily understood but may not conform to prescriptive principles of rationality”. 
If assessments have to be made for multiple stakeholders the need for such compromises is even 
greater as otherwise the analysis may well become intractable.  
In almost all modelling processes there is a tension between the extent to which the 
model represents the real problem and the simplifications that are required to keep the process 
tractable. However, the simplification inherent in models brings a number of benefits. It allows 
decision makers to enhance their understanding of problems by focusing on key issues, 
unobscured by less important details. In decision analysis it may even allow a more faithful 
representation of a real problem because the judgments that need to be elicited from decision 
makers are likely to be more straightforward and hence less prone to error (Edwards and Barron, 
1994). Simple modelling processes are also likely to be more attractive to decision makers who 
may be suspicious of “black box” mathematical methods or unwilling to expend the necessary 
time and effort demanded by more complex formulations, though this to some extent may 
depend on cognitive decision making style (Boschetti et al., 2011). The use of a simple 
approximate model with acknowledged limitations may be preferable to a situation where 
decision makers resort to unaided judgments because they are unwilling to engage with a 
difficult modelling process (Keeney, 2004). These considerations lead us to propose the use of 
relatively simple decision analysis models within a CSM framework. 
 
3.2 Identifying stakeholders 
 
Goodpaster (1991) states that, whilst an organization’s managers may not be personally 
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indifferent to the plight of strategically unimportant stakeholders, as managers their concerns are 
likely to focus on the concerns of financial stockholders. Similarly, whilst agreeing Freeman's 
(1994) “broad” definition of stakeholders – as those who can affect or are affected by the 
achievement of the organization's objectives – Heath (2006) notes that any downgrading of 
stockholder interests creates tension with corporate law, where most jurisdictions provide 
stockholders a special status that can be legally enforced. Carson (1993) takes this line of 
argument further in a more general way, arguing that the lesser interests of more important 
stakeholders should sometimes take precedence over the greater interest of less-important 
stakeholders.  
Tashman and Raelin (2013) note that "stakeholder salience" to a particular firm will 
often be based on managerial perceptions. They note that when a firm's managers perceive 
stakeholder interests as conflicting, they are likely to assume that these interests are mutually 
exclusive. They then argue that, in such situations, managers may overlook one or more 
stakeholders because of an inability to cope with the resulting complexity – labeling this a 
“boundedly rational” response. Alternately, managers may undertake stakeholder analysis only 
to identify those that might resist or retaliate against the organization’s actions (cf. Ackermann 
and Eden, 2011). 
The approach that we present here is specifically designed to enable engagement with 
complexity and ambiguity and facilitate “democratic conversation” on points of conflict. We 
challenge notions of “important” and “less-important” stakeholders where the focus of decision-
making is on achieving a common good – providing the best outcome for the greatest number 
rather than the greatest return to the financial stockholders, who may be relatively few in 
number. Miles, Munilla and Darroch (2006, p. 195) propose such an inclusive approach, stating 
that it is good business practice “to actively engage all stakeholders…[] in the development of 
sustainable strategies that reflect both economic and socially responsible outcomes”. It is to such 
a value set of business and managerial decision-making that our proposed framework is directed. 
 
3.3 Overview of the augmented critical scenario method 
 
As outlined above, the application of the intuitive logics scenario method will result in 
four scenarios, each representing a plausible future.  Stakeholders may, therefore, find 
themselves in a given scenario, which may have emerged as a result of factors beyond their 
control. For example a UK oil company may find that an overseas government has introduced 
new legislation which places restrictions on foreign oil exploration in its territory. For each 
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stakeholder each scenario may therefore have important implications for the extent to which its 
objectives are achieved.  In some cases the emergence of a given scenario may be beneficial to 
that stakeholder in that its objectives are largely achieved. For example a domestic oil company 
would probably benefit from the legislation described above. However, if a stakeholder finds 
that the conditions prevailing in a particular scenario are inimical to the achievement of its 
objectives it is likely to take action to attempt to remedy the situation if it has the power, relative 
to other stakeholders, to do so. Figure 1 categorises stakeholders based on their power and 
interest in influencing future events. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
 
The concept of power itself is the one of the most contested in the social sciences (cf. 
Rowlands, 1997, Kabeer, 1999). It has been viewed as the ability to make choices (Kabeer, 
1999), the ability to overcome resistance to one’s intended actions from another actor (Emerson, 
1962),  the capacity to impact the surrounding world and the capacity to dominate other beings 
(Lukes 1974), the capacity of individual actors to exert their will (Finkelstein, 1992) and the 
ability to intentionally change another actor’s action-environment (where the action-environment 
consist of an actor’s alternatives, understanding of the situation and valuation) (Balzer, 1992). 
Flyvbjerg (2001, 2003) discusses complex understandings of power with reference to the 
philosophical texts of Nietzsche, Foucault and others.  
In augmented critical scenario method the strategic choices available to stakeholders are 
already specified explicitly so it is important not to double count the ability to make these 
choices when making a subsequent assessment of a stakeholder’s power.  Power is therefore 
perceived as being related to an individual strategy and reflects the ability of a stakeholder to 
pursue that strategy given the conditions that prevail in a scenario and the potential actions of 
other stakeholders. This means that stakeholders who have no option but to pursue a single 
strategy may have power in some scenarios when there is no resistance to this strategy. 
Formally, we define power as the probability of being able to implement a strategy in a given 
scenario. An "equilibrium" state, in relation to a particular scenario will occur when either: (i) all 
stakeholders have their objectives satisfied by the unfolding of external events without the need 
for stakeholder action by those with power, (ii) the stakeholders with power act to improve 
achievement of their own objectives and no stakeholder is disadvantaged in objective(s) 
achieved by the opposed actions of another (more) powerful stakeholder (This is akin to a Pareto 
optimal outcome), or (iii) the stakeholders with power act to improve the achievement of their 
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objectives but this is to the disadvantage of stakeholders who lack the power to take such 
actions. 
Multiattribute decision analysis in the form of value scales and swing weights enable 
assessments to be made of the extent to which a given stakeholder’s objectives would be 
achieved in a given scenario, taking into account the trade-offs they would be prepared to make 
between objectives. However, because the focus is on the extent to which an objective would be 
achieved it is necessary to use global scales with end points of “zero achievement” (scoring 0) 
and “complete achievement” (scoring 10). Because the ends of the scale are not arbitrary, as in 
an interval scale, (0 meaning no achievement at all) the scores will be measured on a ratio scale. 
This raises the question of what would represent the complete non achievement or complete 
achievement of an objective. Monat (2009) suggests a number of approaches such as 
experienced extreme values, imagined extremes, aspirational extremes and universal extremes 
(the worst and best possible values conceivable). Using one of these approaches a company 
could, for example, estimate its largest possible annual loss as $50 million and its largest 
possible profit as $60m. When formulating global scales it is important to be aware that overly 
long scales can be problematical in discriminating between a set of options that have values that 
occupy only a small part of the range. For example, profits ranging from  $2 million to $4 
million would have scores that were hardly distinguishable on a scale ranging from -$50 billion 
to +$50 billion. It is important to assess whether the bounds of the scale represent levels that are 
realistic and feasible.   
 
In contrast, there are reasons why a scale may occupy too narrow a range. Behavioral decision 
research indicates that ranges like these are typically underestimated so some extension of them 
may be necessary after careful thought (Makridakis et al, 2009). Montibeller, and von 
Winterfeldt (2015) discuss methods that can reduce or overcome this bias. These include 
eliciting ranges from  multiple experts to generate a wide range of perspectives, the avoidance of 
values that might act as anchors in the estimation process and the use counterfactuals to 
encourage people to think of reasons why an outcome might lie outside the initially estimated 
range. 
 
The power that each stakeholder  has to implement strategies to improve the achievement 
of their objectives in a given scenario can also be assessed on a ratio scale with 0 representing no 
power and 10 representing complete power.  Where stakeholders have a range of alternative 
actions available to improve the achievement of their objectives in a given scenario (and the 
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power to implement these actions) it helps an assessment to be made of which action they would 
be most likely to select.  Finally, in the equilibrium state, the augmented critical scenario method 
enables the extent to which all stakeholders will have achieved their objectives to be determined, 
following the actions of powerful stakeholders. 
 The stages in the augmented critical scenario method are as follows. 
 
1) Formulate scenarios. 
2) Identify stakeholder groupings and the objectives that each wishes to achieve.  
3) Obtain a weighted score to determine the extent to which each stakeholder group’s 
objectives are achieved within each scenario (exclude the effect of any potential new 
actions by stakeholders at this stage). Plot the results. 
4) For each stakeholder who has a significant shortfall in the achievement of their 
objectives in a given scenario, identify strategies available to them (if any) for 
remedying the situation. 
5) For each strategy obtain a new weighted score to determine the extent to which the 
stakeholder’s objectives would be achieved if the strategy was implemented 
6) For each strategy rate the relative power of the stakeholder  to implement the strategy in the 
given scenario 
7) For each scenario, plot the weighted scores of the strategies against the power rating, and 
determine the strategy that each stakeholder would be likely to select 
8) Identify the consequences of these actions for all stakeholders in each scenario 
9) Apply sensitivity analysis to the assessed scores, weights and power ratings.  
 
4. Illustrating the “augmented critical scenario method” 
 
 Our illustrative case study builds on Cairns’ (2014) analysis of global ship disposal and 
the Bangladesh ship breaking industry, in which Factors A and B, respectively, are posited as: 
 
 “Effectiveness of global regulation”, and  
 “Commitment to ‘green practices’ in Bangladesh”. 
 
 Four possible and plausible future scenarios for the combination of the extreme outcomes 
of these are then outlined in terms of: 
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 “Global Cooperation” – effective global regulation combined with internal commitment 
to change in Bangladesh (A1/B1), 
 “World Divided” – nominally effective global regulation, but without commitment to 
enforcement and change within Bangladesh (A1/B2), 
 “Bangladesh Goes Alone” – the industry in Bangladesh is shut down, but dirty breaking 
transfers to other least developed countries (LDCs) without global control (A2/B1), and, 
 “Business-as-usual” – dirty breaking continues unabated (A2/B2). 
 
 Building on these outlines, we expand the scenarios through the various stages as 
follows, with further research from a broad range of sources: 
  
4.1 Stage 1: Formulate scenarios 
 
Our expanded scenario outlines are as follows: 
 
4.1.1 Scenario A: Global Cooperation 
In a world of economic and political stability, there is international agreement and action 
to require disposal of redundant ships by the use of “green” breaking, brought about by the 
combined actions of a wide variety of stakeholders, across and within nations. At the 
international level, there is commitment by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), ship 
builders and owners (cf. NGO Shipbreaking Platform, 2014), insurance brokers, countries of 
registration, etc. to enforce regulation (cf. NGO Shipbreaking Platform, 2013). At the same time, 
there is commitment to the prevention of beaching by the governments of India and Pakistan and 
investment in “green” technologies (cf. Daily Star, 2011), with inward investment and/or 
international aid as well as local finance for Bangladesh. 
 
4.1.2 Scenario B: A World Divided 
Global conditions are characterized by economic and political stability. There is 
concerted action by environmental pressure groups, ship-owning nations’ governments, 
transnational agencies and others at the supply end of the chain to develop a binding accord that 
seeks to end to the practice of beaching. This prevents major international shipping companies 
from selling off ships without retaining control over their final dismantling (cf. 
Recyclingportal.eu, 2009). Bangladesh, however, fails to take action to close down its yards (cf. 
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Huda, 2012) and over time the yards dismantle a diminishing supply of older and smaller ships 
from unregistered sources in countries outside of the accord. 
 
4.1.3 Scenario C: Bangladesh Goes Alone 
The global economic and political environment remains turbulent but, under pressure 
from both international NGOs and local pressure groups such as Young Power for Social Action 
(YPSA) and the Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA), the Bangladesh 
government commits to legislation to ban the beaching and dismantling of ships (cf. Daily Star, 
2012; NGO Platform on Shipbreaking, 2009). However, despite court orders to the contrary (cf. 
Greenpeace/FIDH, 2005), redundant ships continue to be beached for breaking in India, whilst 
Pakistan turns a blind eye, and new operations start up in Africa. With the IMO remaining a 
“toothless tiger” (IMO, 2004) and registration states showing no desire to intervene, the practice 
of beaching persists in its worst form in these other locations. 
 
4.1.4 Scenario D: Business as Usual 
Nothing changes in a world in economic and political uncertainty. There is an expressed 
desire by many to put an end to beaching and dirty breaking, but there is no effective 
international or local framework to prevent it. 
  
4.2 Stage 2: Identify stakeholder groupings and the objectives that each wish to achieve in their 
strategic actions 
 
In this section, we address the objectives of three illustrative stakeholder entities, in order 
to open debate on their interaction with one another. Whilst our framework is designed to 
address the full stakeholder constituency, here we restrict our illustration to three stakeholders 
for reasons of space and simplicity. We recognise that the wider stakeholder constituency 
includes those who have complex and perhaps ambiguous objectives and options and consider 
the possibilities of more complex and inclusive modelling in our later discussion.  
The following stakeholder outlines are based on fact and literature but should not be 
identified as real individuals or organizations that exist in the present or past: 
 
a) GlobeTrade: a global shipping company with the key objective of remaining competitive 
and providing a return to stockholders in a market that is subject to volatile financial and 
international trade conditions. However, the company is mindful of environmental pressures 
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within Europe and the US and possible negative reputation risk factors that might influence its 
institutional stockholders. It considers its CSR options in the context of different external market 
conditions across scenarios. 
 
Figure 2 displays a possible mean-ends objectives network for GlobeTrade.  The 
company has two fundamental objectives at the top of the network. The lower–level objectives 
show how the higher levels objective can be better achieved (Keeney, 1992). The arrows show 
the direction of influence. For example, maximising the number of efficient new ships in the 
company’s fleet, will serve to minimize emissions and help to minimize the negative effects of 
the company’s activities on the environment. However, more new ships in the fleet will also 
mean that more older ships need to be broken. The process of structuring diagrams like this 
should help an analyst to identify gaps where a stakeholder’s objectives may have been 
inadvertently omitted (Bond et al., 2008). The risk of inadvertent omission of objectives can by 
reduced by subsequently challenging people to extend their list of objectives and combining lists 
generated independently by individuals in the planning team (Bond et al., 2010). Ideally, the  
objectives that are eventually identified should meet the criterion of mutual preference 
independence for the stakeholder group. After several iterations two objectives are identified for 
GlobeTrade: (i) maximise financial returns, and (ii) minimise pollution from ‘dirty’ ship 
breaking. 
 
b) GreenWorld: a single issue international environmental NGO with the fundamental 
objective of minimising the shipping industry’s damage to the environment. It thus has a non-
negotiable means objective of minimizing dirty ship breaking. It proclaims its CSR agenda as 
being the common good and it will operate in any way within, and sometimes outside legal 
frameworks using direct action and political manoeuvring.   
 
c) Workers: those who provide labour in one of the major yards in Bangladesh. The workers 
have the fundamental objective of maximising the welfare of their families who mostly live in 
the rural hinterland of northern Bangladesh where there is little or no opportunity for 
employment and no state support. Their means objectives are (i) to maximise their family’s 
income (ii) to minimise risk to their own health and safety (being aware of the atrocious safety 
record of the industry) and the future of their own children, with the reliance on child labour in 
the yards at present (FIDH/YPSA, 2008). However, the ‘health and safety’ means objective 
takes a ‘back seat’ to maximising income as their main concern is “jobs at all costs” (cf. Daily 
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Star, 2009). (For brevity a means-ends objectives network is not displayed for this stakeholder 
group.)  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE. 
 
4.3 Stage 3: Obtain a weighted score to determine the extent to which each stakeholder group’s 
objectives are achieved within each scenario  
 
GlobeTrade estimates that its possible annual returns (measured as profit) could range 
between a loss of $15million and a profit of $180 million.  These are assigned values of 0 and 10 
on the global scale for returns. Profits are then estimated for each scenario and assigned a score 
based on their distance between -$15 million and $180 million. Linear value functions have been 
assumed here for simplicity. Edwards and Barron (1994) found that these were an accurate 
approximation to non-linear value functions, unless the non-linearity was such that the ratio of 
the steepest slope to the least steep was greater than 2.5.   However, Stewart (1996) indicated, on 
the basis of simulations, that multiattribute value models can be sensitive to the shape of the 
constituent value functions. This may particularly be the case where long scales are associated 
with global value functions. When linearity cannot be assumed, methods such as bisection (e.g. 
see Goodwin and Wright, 2014, p.43) can be used to elicit the required values. For ‘dirty ship 
breaking’ the gross tonnage of the company’s ships broken in this way per year is estimated to 
range from 0 to 1.5 million. These are assigned values of 10 and 0, respectively on the global 
scale for gross ship tonnage broken. The estimated number that would be broken in each 
scenario is then mapped on to this scale.  Table 1 shows the scores obtained.  Note that, in the 
case of objectives for which there is no natural numeric scale (e.g. company image or 
reputation), scores can be assigned directly onto the scale to show how a stakeholder’s 
preference for a given outcome compared to the worst and best possible outcomes. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
 
For example, the best financial returns are obtained in the Business-as-Usual scenario, 
though this is only 80% of what the company would regard as its best conceivable profit, and the 
worst under Global Cooperation. GlobeTrade’s preferences for a swing between the worst and 
best possible position in each objective are compared, that is an improvement in annual profit 
from -$5 million to $180 million is compared with an improvement in the deadweight tonnage of 
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ships broken under dirty conditions from 1.5 million to zero. The swing on the financial returns 
objectives is the most preferred so this is assigned a ‘raw’ weight of 10. A swing on the ship 
breaking objective is considered only 2/3 as preferable yielding a raw weight of 6.67. These 
weights are then normalized by dividing by their sum (16.67) to yield weights of 0.6 for ‘returns’ 
and 0.4 for ‘ship breaking’. These weights are multiplied by the scores to give weighted average 
scores that show the relative extent to which GlobeTrade meets its objectives in each scenario. 
The results are shown in Table 2. Comparing these to the maximum value of 10 indicates that 
that GlobeTrade would be dissatisfied in all scenarios, particularly World Divided.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. 
 
Table 3 shows the weighted scores for all stakeholders. These have been obtained using a 
similar process to that used for GlobeTrade. Note that GreenWorld will be extremely dissatisfied 
in the Business-as-Usual as scenario, while the Workers see their interests as best served in this 
scenario. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE. 
 
4.4 Stage 4: For each stakeholder who has a significant shortfall in the achievement of their 
objectives in a given scenario, identify strategies available to them (if any) for remedying the 
situation. 
 
For GlobeTrade, the strategic options to remain competitive in volatile trading 
conditions, but with secondary consideration of the CSR/environmental agenda and its possible 
consequences are posited as: 
 
 a)  Order new efficient ships and dispose of old ships directly to “green” breakers, 
 b)  Order new efficient ships and dispose of old ships on an open market through  third-
party agents, seeking guarantees of “green” disposal. These, however, have been 
shown to be unenforceable internationally and often unenforced locally (cf. 
Government of India, 2009; IMOWatch, 2010; USEPA, 20091), 
                                                          
1 The references here relate to the illegal export of the former cruise ship Oceania from the 
United States, its arrival at Alang in India under the name Platinum ll and its eventual 
beaching and breaking there despite court orders forbidding its import and beaching. 
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c) Keep ships until end of viable life then dispose of them on open market, most likely to 
end life on dirty beaches under current prevailing conditions. 
 
 For GreenWorld, with its no-compromise focus on a closure agenda, we posit a single 
strategic option; that is, to advocate for green ship breaking globally and the closure of all dirty 
beaching yards. Finally, we see the Workers as having no real strategic options, other than 
continuing with the status quo. We have assumed here that strategies can be applied in different 
scenarios. In some cases, a completely different set of strategies may be applicable in each 
scenario. 
 
4.5 Stage 5: For each strategy obtain a new weighted score to determine the extent to which the 
stakeholder’s objectives would be achieved if the strategy was implemented 
 
 Only GlobeTrade has multiple strategies available to it. Table 4 shows the effectiveness 
of each strategy (measured, as before, on the 0 to 10 global scale) in achieving each objective in 
each scenario. Note that these scores reflect the conditions that exist within each scenario and the 
likely actions of other stakeholders within that scenario. Actions by GreenWorld against 
GlobeTrade if it pursues the strategy of keeping ships to the end of their life are not thought to 
influence significantly GlobeTrade’s returns in this scenario though their actions may  reduce 
the probability of this strategy being adopted in the first place (see Stage 6). 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE. 
 
 The swing weights that were derived earlier are applied to these scores to obtain the weighted 
scores in Table 5. These indicate that under the scenario of Global Cooperation, GlobeTrade would have 
no choice but to order new efficient ships and dispose of old ships directly to “green” breakers. It 
would also prefer to follow this strategy in the World Divided and Goes Alone scenarios, though 
in the latter case there is some uncertainty as keeping ships until the end of their life and then 
disposing of them on the open market is almost as attractive.  Under Business-as-Usual it would 
clearly prefer to keep ships until the end of their life. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE. 
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 The scores, from 0-10, may be read as addressing Flyvbjerg’s (2003) second question: 
“Is this development desirable?”  
 
4.6 Stage 6: For each strategy rate the relative power of the stakeholder to implement the 
strategy in the given scenario 
 
While stakeholders may have strategies that they would most wish to pursue they may 
not always have the power to pursue them. Factors inherent in a given scenario, such as market 
conditions, and the potential actions of other stakeholders or regulatory bodies, such as 
governments, may restrict the probability that a given strategy can be pursued in a given 
scenario. For each scenario we therefore estimate a power index to reflect the probability that a 
given strategy will be implementable in a particular scenario. This index is measured on a 0 
(zero probability) to 10 (certainty) ratio scale. Note that the probability of being able to 
implement a strategy is to be distinguished from the success, or otherwise, of achieving one’s 
objectives through that strategy. The latter is already reflected in the weighted scores in Table 5.  
We expect that, in scenarios like World Divided , Goes Alone, and Business-as-Usual, 
GlobeTrade’s ability to pursue strategy ‘a’  (ordering new efficient ships and dispose of old 
ships directly to “green” breakers) would be threatened by the actions of competitors who, could 
undercut its shipping rates by pursuing a  ‘less green’ strategy. Thus, for example in the 
Business-as-Usual scenario we estimate that the there is only a 4/10 probability that they would 
consider this strategy to be feasible. Similarly, pressure groups like GreenWorld could imperil 
GlobeTrade’s ability to pursue strategy ‘c’ (keeping ships to the end of their life) through actions 
intended to adversely affect the company’s reputation. Hence in the Business-as-Usual scenario 
this strategy would only have 7/10 probability of being pursued by the company even though 
this strategy has the highest weighted score in that scenario.  GreenWorld is able to continue its 
advocacy for green ship breaking globally and the closure of all dirty beaching yard in all 
scenarios and hence has a power score of 10/10 in all cases. The probability of the workers being 
able to pursue their strategy of protecting the welfare of their families is entirely dependent upon 
the power, interests and actions of others. In the Global Cooperation and Goes Alone scenarios, 
most if not all will lose their jobs and, hence, their only power source, that of their physical 
labour. However, in the World Divided scenario, they maintain some degree of power over the 
ability to provide their labour in the near future. In the Business-As-Usual scenario, with the 
industry status quo maintained, their labour is their source of power. Table 6 shows the power 
ratings for each scenario, together with the scores for each strategy. 
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INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE. 
  
4.7 Stage 7: For each scenario, plot the weighted scores of the strategies again the power 
rating, and determine the strategy that each stakeholder would be likely to select 
 
The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 3. It can be seen that in the Global 
Cooperation scenario the actions of the stakeholders are well defined. The Workers have no 
power to continue the status quo and both GlobeTrade and GreenWorld are able to pursue their 
single available strategies.  In World Divided, GlobeTrade is most likely to pursue strategy a: 
“Order new efficient ships and dispose of old ships directly to green breakers” as this has the 
highest score and they also have the highest probability of implementing this strategy. Under the 
Goes Alone scenario there is some uncertainty as to whether they would pursue strategy ‘a’ or 
’b’, as the former has the highest score but the latter has a greater probability of being 
implementable. Under Business-as-Usual they will probably pursue c: “Keep ships until end of 
viable life then dispose of them on open market” as this yields the highest score and has the 
greatest possibility of being implemented. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE. 
 
4.8 Stage 8: Identify the consequences of these actions for all stakeholders in each scenario. 
 
Next, we consider the level of achievement of stakeholders’ objective from the present day 
to the future outlined in each scenario, providing a response to the first part of Flyvbjerg’s 
(2003) fourth question – “Who gains and who loses?”. Note that direct comparison of the levels 
of satisfaction achieved by different stakeholders in a given scenario is not possible. A swing 
from a weighted score of 0 to 10 may bring more satisfaction to one stakeholder than another. 
Hence we can only consider the extent which given stakeholders gain or lose in different 
scenarios. 
In considering our stakeholders individually, we can see that GlobeTrade, with its different 
strategic options, has more opportunity for achieving its objectives to a great extent across all 
scenarios through varying its selected option to meet the different economic and trading 
conditions that it faces, but with compromise on any CSR agenda. At the same time, the single 
issue GreenWorld has a much clearer gain/lose divide across scenarios. Relative to these global 
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entities, the Workers are shown to be much more in a position of losing, particularly in relation 
to a focus on the key objective of maintaining livelihood, which is presented as a win situation 
only in the Business-As-Usual (D) scenario. 
 
4.9 Stage 9: Apply sensitivity analysis to the assessed scores, weights and power ratings.  
 
Because the scores, weights and power ratings are subjective estimates it is advisable to 
investigate how robust the indications of the model are to changes in these values. Also when a 
team is making the assessments there may be disagreements between individual members and it 
useful to investigate the extent to which these differences would have an impact on the 
conclusions drawn from the model.  One question is whether there are circumstances where 
GlobeTrade would be likely to pursue the ‘greenest’ strategy (a) in the Business-as-Usual 
scenario. This would be likely to be the case if this strategy was placed to the ‘north-east’ of the 
GlobeTrade’s other strategies in the Business-as-Usual chart in figure 3. To achieve this, the 
power to implement this strategy would have to increase from 4 to above 7 and the normalized 
weight placed on minimising dirty ship breaking would have to increase from 0.4 to greater than 
0.5 (see figure 4). Thus only a slight change in the weights could lead to the pursuit of this 
strategy. However, increasing the power to implement it might pose more of a challenge, with 
likely market conditions of high competition and costs combined with over-capacity and low sea 
freight rates. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE. 
 
5. Implications of the analysis 
 
 Our framework enables consideration of complex, inter-stakeholder relationships and the 
impact of strategic decision-making in support of, or in conflict with, the objectives and 
aspirations of others. Here, developing our illustrative case study, we focus specifically on 
decisions informed by organizations’ considerations of corporate social responsibility and the 
potential impacts of these decisions on remote stakeholders. 
 As we have indicated for GlobeTrade, multinational companies (MNCs) can most likely 
pursue alternative strategies. These will be informed and constrained by internal priorities and 
external factors: prevailing economic and trading conditions, international legal frameworks, 
political decisions and, to some extent, societal pressures. For example, under turbulent global 
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trading conditions, GlobeTrade may be inclined towards a symbolic rather than substantive 
commitment to CSR (Perez-Batres et al., 2012). In addition, if global regulatory frameworks 
remain weak or non-existent (cf. Recyclingportal.eu, 2012), then there are no real grounds for 
concerned stockholders to exert pressure for substantive commitment. However, there is 
precedent for international NGOs like GreenWorld pursuing aggressive strategies that force 
alternative approaches by MNCs, as with Greenpeace’s engagement with Shell in relation to the 
Brent Spar oil platform (cf. Kirby, 1998). Across scenarios, depending upon the specific 
economic, political, social and regulatory frameworks that exist, we see major organizations 
setting strategies that are both responsive to different futures for their own benefit and setting the 
ground for how others will be impacted within these different scenarios. However, as we posit 
for the Bangladesh Worker stakeholders, other stakeholders may have little or no capability to 
set strategy. At the same time, they may have aspirations that will either be met or destroyed by 
the actions of others. 
 This brings us back to consideration of Flybjerg’s third question – “What, if anything, 
should we do about it?”  Here, we turn to consideration of the interplay between one group’s 
strategy and another’s future, looking first at the Global Cooperation (A) scenario. Here, Figure 
2 indicates that both GlobeTrade and GreenWorld have achieved high weighted scores, with 
GlobeTrade having done so through pursuing its first choice strategic option that both generates 
stockholder return and follows a CSR/environmental agenda of common good. The external 
conditions are such that economic and political stability supports collaboration and cooperation 
across organizations and agencies. However, for the Worker group; with members who have no 
employment contracts, no security of employment, no trade union support and no real options 
for alternative employment; “jobs at any cost” is the key objective. Here, the Worker group are 
losers, compared to the outcome received under the Business as Usual (D) scenario, with the 
closure of the dirty breaking yards and, as a result, the loss of most of the associated jobs. 
Notice, however, that the Global Cooperation (A) scenario represents “equilibrium” state  (iii) – 
see our earlier discussion in Section 3.3. 
In the Global Cooperation scenario then, the “good” intentions of GlobeTrade and 
GreenWorld lead to unintended consequences of loss of livelihood. Unless there is associated 
investment in new “green” breaking yards in Bangladesh and; since these would be unlikely to 
employ the same complement of workers; other investment in new forms of job creation, the 
Workers will likely remain absolute losers. Broadening our deliberations where all stakeholders 
are considered, we might posit that to raise the Workers out of the loser category would require 
the exercise of power by the Bangladesh government. However, the domain of power of the 
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government of one of the world’s poorest countries is limited beyond its own boundaries. As 
such, it would require collaboration with and support from organizations and governments with 
broader economic and political power to bring necessary investment to build employment 
opportunities. 
 In the Business-As-Usual (D) scenario (Figure 3), GreenWorld is shown as a complete 
loser in relation to its single cause and objective whilst, here, GlobeTrade’s success in a weak 
economy and global market rests upon its focus on financial measures only, and withdrawal 
from any effective CSR/environmental agenda for ship disposal. If, however, GlobeTrade 
wishes to follow strategy (i) of ship replacement and green disposal within a scenario of 
Business-As-Usual for others, then it must do so by seeking to exercise its power in order to 
influence others to steer the future away from this scenario and towards the Global Cooperation 
scenario. However, it must do this under poor market conditions.  
 As we see, GlobeTrade has strategic options, but ones that require it to make decisions 
between objectives that are in opposition to each other in this scenario. If the company chooses 
to act for broad social, sustainability reasons rather than purely its own narrow financial 
purposes, then the latter aim; and the primary objective of competitiveness; will be 
compromised. We see here that GlobeTrade has options within this scenario whilst GreenWorld 
is seen to lose out.  However, the Bangladesh Workers’ desire for jobs at any cost is met only in 
this scenario. Here the group has power to maintain the status quo, and to achieve its primary 
objective, through possession of its own physical labour which remains in demand on the 
beaches.  
 Similar tensions and issues can be identified between stakeholders across the remaining 
two scenarios, dependent upon which strategic options are pursued.  The Bangladesh Goes 
Alone scenario shows a future in which the nation’s government has exercised power to close 
down the industry (cf. Daily Star, 2012). However, the government’s power does not transcend 
national boundaries, and no similar action is taken within other key jurisdictions of India and 
Pakistan. Here, we must consider the power differentials between nations, agencies and 
organizations across the supply chain, and the extent to which any one can bring about 
meaningful change acting on its own. 
 As in our example, with most such issues the interplay between stakeholder groupings 
will be complex and dynamic. Stakeholders that are, at one point, set in the background may be 
using their influence to build pressure that precludes the enactment of particular strategies by 
other actors. Ackermann and Eden (2011) provide a useful approach to identifying and analysing 
situations where one stakeholder’s actions can generate a dynamic set of responses across a 
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range of other stakeholders. Their “Stakeholder Influence Network” plots visually the formal 
and informal relationships between stakeholder groupings, providing insights into the degree to 
which a focal organization’s actions are likely to be monitored by other specific stakeholders – 
by considering which of the specific stakeholder’s goals might be attacked or endangered by a 
particular strategy or action. In our framework, considering every stakeholder’s position relative 
to other stakeholders’ prompts questions on the nature and relationships of power, on what if 
anything should be done about it, and on who gains and who loses as a result of decisions made.  
 
6. Discussion  
 
 The framework of augmented CSM, that we have proposed and illustrated here, has the 
potential, when applied to considerations such as CSR, to enable democratic conversation on 
what is a complex and conflicted situation (Miles et al., 2006). Incorporating global scales for 
the level of achievement of key objectives and for the power for different stakeholder groups to 
pursue strategies designed to enhance the extent to which objectives are achieved, the model 
permits a dynamic evaluation of positions. It thereby enables a more nuanced analysis of the 
status of individual stakeholder groupings relative to each other within and across multiple 
future scenarios (see Table 7). Critically, the design of the method takes into account the need to  
provide a modelling framework that mitigates the cognitive biases that  would likely to be 
associated with unstructured strategic choice. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE. 
 
Our approach supports consideration of the choices that some organizations have 
between different CSR agendas – ranging from the symbolic to the substantive – the impacts of 
choice on other stakeholders, and the role of power and pressure in determining choice and 
outcome (Perez-Batres et al., 2012). It incorporates the core elements of both scenario-based 
decision analysis and critical scenario method (CSM) that have established foundations, 
respectively, in the literature on systematic strategy analysis (Goodwin and Wright, 2001, 2014) 
and application of Aristotelian phronēsis as a mode of social inquiry (Flyvbjerg, 2001, 2003).  
As indicated earlier our modelling framework is designed to be accessible to decision 
makers and planners from all backgrounds and, as such, involves a number of  compromises 
most of which can be overcome at the cost of additional complexity. First, the swing weights are 
assumed to be constant across all scenarios. In many cases this is likely to be a reasonable 
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assumption. For example the trade-off between increased financial returns and more pollution 
may not depend on which scenario is being considered. In other cases, for example, where the 
scenarios include different levels of cultural or political tolerance of pollution, weights specific 
to each scenario may need to be elicited (Montibeller et al., 20061). Similarly, as presented, our 
framework assumed that stakeholders had objectives that were applicable across all scenarios. In 
some cases different objectives may apply in different scenarios.   
Our power indices assumed that we could determine the probability of prevailing with a 
given strategy in the light of the action of other stakeholders. This itself assumes that a 
stakeholder has both the political acumen and the will to exercise their power to pursue a 
strategy when it is in their interests to do so (the ‘skill and will’ Mintzberg, 1983) In some 
situations the reaction of other stakeholders might itself be uncertain so that we may, for 
example, have a 0.8 probability of prevailing if they employ strategy A and a 0.4 probability if 
they employ strategy B.  This situation could simply be displayed as two separate points on 
figure 2 to inform any discussion that is being supported by the model. Alternatively, the 
application of game theory may point to a state of equilibrium between the stakeholders, 
possibly indicating that each party would have complete power to pursue a particular strategy, 
given the reaction of the other (c.f. Dixit and Skeath, 1999). Similarly, if GreenWorld had 
alternative strategies available these might impact GlobeWorld’s weighted scores to different 
degrees. Again a game-theory matrix could be used here to display how the weighted scores 
depended on the interaction of the strategies of the opposing stakeholders and possibly be used 
to identify equilibrium.  
In addition, the strategies were assumed to be discrete and mutually exclusive. The 
implementation of strategies along continua is possible (for example, GreenWorld might decide 
to assign resources anywhere between $50m and $100m  to contesting dirty ship breaking) as are 
mixtures of strategies (e.g. commission a few new ships and send two-thirds of decommissioned 
ships to the green breakers and a third to the open market). These could be most easily 
represented within the framework by a few selected ‘discrete’ strategies (e.g. GreenWorld assign 
resources of $50, $75 or $100m) which should be sufficient to inform the conversation that the 
model is supporting. 
Finally, the modelling framework assumes that the axioms of multiattribute value theory 
are valid in situations where it is being applied, that mutual preference independence applies to 
all stakeholders (c.f. Goodwin and Wright 2014, p.52) and that stakeholders will behave 
rationally in that they will choose the strategy that maximises their weighted score in cases 
where the power to implement different strategies is equal. 
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The scales presented for power and achievement of objectives are, of course, our own 
value-laden assessments of the positions of others with information accessed through secondary 
sources. However, as discussed earlier, approaches like this have been successful in supporting 
preparations for negotiations with other parties. Moreover, our assessments are based upon in-
depth knowledge of the literature on ship disposal and of key decisions and actions across the 
global and Bangladesh contexts. Whilst acknowledging our own subjectivity in this particular 
illustrative case study, in the application of the method in the practice arena there is the 
opportunity for in-depth research and analysis of the focal issue from multiple perspectives, and 
for live engagement with stakeholders in undertaking the scenario construction and developing 
the various indices. By raising questions about the interests and relative power of key 
stakeholders the application of augmented CSM will provides guidance on what information 
needs to be gathered and where in-depth research  needs to be directed. 
Where it is not possible to engage the entire stakeholder constituency – which would be 
the likely situation for our issue no matter what the time and resources available – we advocate 
either engagement of legitimate proxy groups, or consideration of role-play of excluded groups 
by active participants. It has been shown that, even where participants have no first-hand 
experience of the lives of others, role-play can enhance the quality of the valid prediction of 
stakeholders’ actions – beyond mere information gathering (Green and Armstrong, 2011). This 
approach is equally applicable in the classroom where our analytic framework can be used as a 
mode of action learning. 
 Notwithstanding the insights derived from role-play, since our method can be used in a 
team-based context – where individual members’ evaluations of stakeholders’: (i) key objective 
achievement, and (ii) degree of power are explored and evaluated – it is possible that there will 
be differences of opinion. It may be that minor differences in such evaluations have little impact 
on the outcome of the interplay between actors and a particular unfolding future. However, more 
substantial differences in the evaluations must be addressed, since these may indicate very 
different scenario out-turns and, as such, these out-turns are sensitive to the team members’ 
evaluations. In these circumstances, further analysis and discussion must be undertaken in order 
to bring a resolution of the identified sensitivities. 
We recently taught our analytic method within an Executive MBA course on strategy. 
Following introduction to the method in a group problem-based learning workshop, participants 
selected a key issue facing their own organizations to undertake individual analysis.  There were 
informal comments that the nine-stage method was time-consuming but that it was clear and 
easy to follow. Also, informal feedback indicated that the subjectivity of dealing with multiple 
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stakeholders was both challenging and insightful. Our model requires that students identify 
remote but impacted, rather than merely immediate and involved stakeholders. For many, this 
was an exercise not considered by their organizations and, for some, one that raised ethical 
questions that challenged the basic assumptions of the business model. It would be 
straightforward, in such teaching contexts, to include attitudinal measurements of the perceived 
value of the stakeholder analysis component relative to other components that provide structure 
to the analysis of an organisation's business environment. However, such data-gathering would 
only provide further evaluation of the new method, rather than a validation. A similar issue 
pervades the use of scenario planning - which is also practitioner-derived rather than axiom-
based. Attempts to validate scenario planning by analysing the performance of organisations that 
have adopted its use, compared to matched organisations that have not, necessarily include 
confounds. Only within the psychological laboratory is validation possible. However, the 
complexity of our analytic method coupled with the time requirements of a full scenario 
exercise precludes straightforward experimental manipulation in a controlled setting, whether to 
evaluate basic scenario analysis or our augmentation with the stakeholder analysis component. 
 Given these issues, iIn our view, future research would best be employed to evaluate 
decision makers’ experiences of using the method in different contexts and also address the 
importance of the limitations identified above, together with methods for overcoming them. For 
example, to what extent would making swing weights specific to  particular scenarios add to the 
complexity of the method and potentially reduce its acceptability to users? How could game 
theory matrices best be integrated with the method, when the weighted scores of stakeholders 
depend on the interaction of their strategies, without sacrificing the method’s tractability? Our 
application in the MBA classroom, outlined above, was within a stand-alone course which also 
provided the students’ first introduction to scenario methods and for which feedback was 
informal. Future iterations could incorporate more formal subjective evaluation under conditions 
of ethics approval. Further, some of the possibilities we outline here for evaluation of our model 
against other approaches might be tested and evaluated in a more controlled teaching 
environment. For example, where students are introduced to the theory and use of scenario 
methods at the outset of their study program (cf. Bradfield, Cairns & Wright, in press), they 
might then be required at a later stage to evaluate decisions in response to the same basic 
scenario problem using the alternative approaches outlined above. 
Overall, our analytic framework is designed to enable a more complex and nuanced 
engagement with the “multiple realities” (Beech and Cairns, 2001) of stakeholder worlds. 
Formatted: Indent: First line:  1.27 cm
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As such, it extends the possibilities of decision analysis in relation to strategic options across 
multiple scenarios and beyond the single organization’s field of interest (cf. Wright and Cairns, 
2011), to incorporate broad stakeholder (Freeman, 1994) engagement and analysis. 
  
7. Concluding remarks 
 
 Strategic planning in an uncertain and volatile world, where there are multiple 
stakeholders with multiple objectives is likely to be complex. There is evidence from behavioral 
decision research that, when faced with this complexity, unaided decision makers can be subject 
to cognitive biases because of their inability to simultaneously process all the information 
required. Our aim is this paper has been to present a structured approach that allows decision 
makers to address the full range of issues and relationships that are pertinent in a given situation 
enabling them to gain new insights and a deeper understanding of their strategic options, taking 
into account the likely behavior of key actors if different futures prevail.   Our step-by-step 
method analyses  the interplay between stakeholders who have both different values and 
objectives and also differing degrees of power to act to achieve their objectives within an 
unfolding set of events. As such it facilitates engagement with complex and conflicted situations 
and provides an aid to subsequent decision-making – whether based upon a CSR agenda, as 
here, or on an instrumental firm-centric rationality. 
 We propose that our method has potential value both in the classroom and the 
boardroom; as a means of exploring complex business issues and assessing strategic options; and 
in broad society, for engaging with an analysis of the impact of organizational strategy and 
action across all stakeholders. In situations where there are overarching stakeholders with 
virtually complete power within their own domains, like governments, the framework also has 
potential value in identifying where interventions might be necessary to protect stakeholders 
who lack the power to resist exploitation or harm. 
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Figure 1. Stakeholder matrix (based upon Wright and Cairns, 2011: 922) 
 
  
                                                          
2 Note: In relation to our discussion of “key objectives”, those with low interest may be read as having no immediate objective 
to pursue in the present. However, within the dynamics of unfolding futures, they may have interests to move to protect under  
certain future scenarios. 
 
Low Power 
Low Interest High Interest 
High Power 
Context Setters 
Bystanders Subjects 
Players 
Those with immediate 
power and interest – the 
current decision makers 
Those with power but 
no immediate interest – 
dormant decision 
shapers 
Those with immediate 
interest but lacking 
power – may be content 
or frustrated 
Those with no 
immediate interest or 
power – but, how might 
that change in future? 
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Figure 2. A provisional mean-ends objectives network for GlobeTrade 
 
 
  
  
  
  
Maximise return to investors 
under all market conditions   
Minimise negative impacts of 
business on environment  
  
     
Minimise environmental 
damage from breaking 
old ships 
  
  
Maximise number of 
efficient ships in fleet       
  
Minimize emissions 
from ships in fleet      
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Objective 
A – Global 
Cooperation 
B – World 
Divided 
C - Goes 
Alone 
D - Business-
As-Usual 
Maximise returns 3 4 6 8 
Minimise dirty ship breaking 10 3 2 0 
 
Table 1.   Scores for GlobeTrade for each objective in each scenario 
 
 
  
A – Global 
Cooperation 
B – World 
Divided 
C - Goes 
Alone 
D - Business-
As-Usual 
Weighted score 5.8 3.6 4.4 4.8 
 
Table 2.   Weighted scores for GlobeTrade for all objectives in each scenario 
 
 
Stakeholder 
A – Global 
Cooperation 
B – World 
Divided 
C - Goes 
Alone 
D - 
Business-
As-Usual 
GlobeTrade 5.8 3.6 4.4 4.8 
GreenWorld 10.0 6.6 4.6 0.0 
Workers 4.5 1.8 0.9 9.1 
 
Table 3.   Weighted scores for each stakeholder in each scenario 
 
 
Objective: Maximise returns 
    
Strategy 
A – Global 
Cooperation 
B – World 
Divided 
C - Goes 
Alone 
D - Business-
As-Usual 
a) New ships & green breakers 7 6 4 0 
b) New ships & open market disposal n/a 3 4 6 
c) Keep ships until end of life n/a n/a 8 10 
 
Objective: Minimise dirty ship breaking 
   
Strategy 
A – Global 
Cooperation 
B – World 
Divided 
C - Goes 
Alone 
D - Business-
As-Usual 
a) New ships & green breakers 10 10 10 10 
b) New ships & open market disposal n/a 4 4 0 
c) Keep ships until end of life n/a n/a 2 0 
 
Table 4.   Scores for GlobeTrade’s strategies on each objective in each scenario 
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A – Global 
Cooperation 
B – World 
Divided 
C - Goes 
Alone 
D - Business-
As-Usual 
a) New ships & green breakers 8.2 7.6 6.4 4.0 
b) New ships & open mkt disposal n/a 3.4 4.0 3.6 
c) Keep ships until end of life n/a n/a 5.6 6.0 
 
Table 5.   Weighted scores for GlobeTrade’s strategies in each scenario 
 
 
 
Table 6.   Power ratings and weighted scores in each scenario 
  
Global cooperation Power Score Comment 
GlobeTrade a 10 8.2 
GreenWorld 10 10.0 
Workers 0 4.5 Most jobs lost with no other options 
World divided Power Score Comment 
GlobeTrade a 8 7.6 Power restricted by competition 
GlobeTrade b 7 3.4 Power restricted by competition 
GreenWorld 10 6.6 
Workers 2 1.8 Reducing no. of jobs over time 
Goes alone Power Score Comment 
GlobeTrade a 6 6.4 Power restricted by competition 
GlobeTrade b 7 4 Power restricted by competition & pressure groups 
GlobeTrade c 5 5.6 Power restricted by pressure groups 
GreenWorld 10 4.6 
Workers 0 0.9 Most jobs lost with no other options 
Business-as-usual Power Score Comment 
GlobeTrade a 4 4 Power restricted by competition 
GlobeTrade b 4 3.6 Power restricted by competition & pressure groups 
GlobeTrade c 7 6 Power restricted by pressure groups 
GreenWorld 10 0 
Workers 8 9.1 Power only of supplying labour 
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Figure 3. Scores and power ratings of stakeholders in the four scenarios 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Sensitivity analysis for GlobeTrades’ strategies in the Business-as-Usual scenario 
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 Basic CSM Augmented CSM 
Stakeholder Evaluation Qualitative assessment of the power 
and objectives of each stakeholder 
 
Formal structured quantitative 
assessment of (i) the amount-of-power 
and (ii) the degree-of-achievement of 
objectives, by each stakeholder 
Stakeholder Position “Audience” –  the analysis assumes a 
static positioning of each stakeholder to 
unfolding events in the external 
environment 
“Actors” –  each stakeholder may be 
active or passive in response to 
unfolding events in the external 
environment, some stakeholders have 
the option of influencing those events 
and their outcomes 
Temporal Analysis Simple winner/loser evaluation of the 
relative positioning of each stakeholder 
after each scenario unfolds 
Dynamic evaluation, over time, of the 
power/objectives-achieved positioning 
of each stakeholder within each 
unfolding scenario 
 
Table 7. Comparative features of “basic CSM” and “augmented CSM” 
 
